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The Trinity and Christian Life: A Broadly Thomistic Account of Participation  
 
 
In recent years, the doctrine of the Trinity has been frequently invoked as a model 
for the Christian life.
1
 However, there are different views on what is involved in the 
participation of human beings in the divine life. In some cases, moreover, the very nature 
and entailments of this participation are not always rendered entirely perspicuous. The 
purpose of this paper is to explain in broadly Thomist terms how the doctrine of the 
Trinity might be said to afford a model for life in God, and critically to situate this 
account within the context of a larger discussion on the topic.  
In his well-known treatise on The Trinity, Karl Rahner famously bemoans the fact 
that the doctrine of the Trinity is treated quite separately from that of the Incarnation in 
treatises like Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae, which both represents and establishes the 
agenda of the Western theological tradition.
2
 In practice, Rahner contends, this separation 
renders Christianity a monotheist religion. Furthermore, it deprives Christians of a robust 
understanding of what it means to share in Christ’s life or imitate him, who is, after all, 
the Image of the Trinity. 
In an attempt to remedy the existing theological situation, Rahner takes great 
pains to forge a connection between the economy of salvation through Christ and the 
inner life of the Triune God. In this connection, he formulated his well-known rule, 
according to which, ‘the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, and the immanent 
Trinity is the economic Trinity’.3  The upshot of this rule is that, from the human point of 
view, there is no knowledge of the Trinity outside of the Incarnation of Christ—even if 
there is knowledge along these lines for God. Thus, the doctrine of the Trinity is 
inextricably linked to Christian faith; conversely, Christian faith cannot be practically 
monotheist.  
The delineation of ‘Rahner’s rule’ is largely to credit not only for instigating a 
revival of Trinitarian theology but also for inspiring inquiries concerning the practical 
ramifications of Trinitarian theology for an understanding of Christian life, which remain 
the subject of intense theological interest to this day. Of course, many scholars have gone 
further than Rahner in the development of his rule, arguing that God is ‘for us’ or nothing 
at all—that the immanent Trinity is or collapses into the economic Trinity, even, on some 
level, for God.
4
 In many such accounts, a preliminary to this understanding of the Trinity, 
to which I will return momentarily, is an account of God’s general nature, which breaks 
down the presumably Thomist divide between deus unus and deus trinus by depicting the 
nature of the one God in already more ‘personal’, even human terms, which are 
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supposedly more compatible with the personal conception of God any worthy doctrine of 
the Trinity would entail.  
According to the critics of Aquinas and other proponents of traditional theology, 
the general western conception of God’s nature is nothing but a recycled version of the 
Greek conception of an utterly immovable and detached God who makes contact with his 
creatures only through intermediaries, and is in no way willing or able to empathise with 
the exigencies of their situation.
5
 So conceived, the western Christian God is not only 
fundamentally monotheist, with the Trinity remaining something of a theological 
afterthought. He is, at best, a mere philosophical construct, at worst, an idol that falls 
short of the personal God of Christian worship.  
In the attempt to rectify, in fact, replace, this notion of God, many have resorted 
to some version of process theology, which is inherently amenable to the task of 
rendering God capable of relating to human beings. According to process theology, also 
known in some guises as ‘panentheism’ or ‘dialectical theism’6, systems of thought 
which are nonetheless subject to considerable diversity, God takes on and pervades 
creaturely and specifically human modes of being like temporality, transience, and 
finitude, to the point of experiencing evil and suffering. At the same time, however, he 
‘prehends’ or subsumes all things in himself, thus preserving his transcendence, albeit in 
a highly attenuated or qualified way. On this showing, consequently, God emerges as 
capable of empathizing with the exigencies and even the horrors of the human condition. 
He is affirmed as personal in the fullest sense of the term.  
In many instances, a panentheist account sets the stage for the development of a 
social doctrine of the Trinity, which completes the aforementioned project of casting God 
as ‘for us’, to the point of being like us.7 That is not to say that all panentheists are social 
Trinitarians or vice versa. A fair number of thinkers seem interested in only one of the 
positions, without much or any reference to the other. Although some do not take 
advantage of it, there seems nevertheless to be a natural partnership between panentheism 
and social Trinitarianism which is celebrated in accounts like that of Jurgen Moltman and 
Paul Fiddes, who hold the positions together. 
Whereas panentheism in many respects renders God similar to his human subjects, 
social Trinitarianism builds on this foundation implicitly or explicitly to contend that 
human beings must aspire to relate to one another after the manner of the three persons 
that constitute the divine being. That said, it is worth noting that social doctrines of the 
Trinity are subject to as much diversity as characterizes uses of panentheism, and may be 
found in the work of philosophers as well as theologians.
8
 In an effort to preserve the 
uniqueness and individuality of those persons, social Trinitarians tend to define them in 
quasi-modern terms as distinct or autonomous centres of agency and consciousness, a 
view that has invited charges of tritheism.  
In response to such charges, social Trinitarians have tended to emphasize that the 
three persons mutually inter-penetrate, co-inhere, indwell, even define one another, in a 
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mode of relating that is referred to as perichoresis.
9
 Because the three persons are thus 
effectively rendered a function of their relationships with one another, their unity is 
ultimately maintained. As one critic has noted, however, ‘any notion of perichoresis 
strong enough to mitigate the accusation of tritheism is too strong to maintain full 
personhood within the Trinity.’10 Thus, social Trinitarianism seems to entail a 
contradiction in terms. 
After the manner of the persons of the Trinity, social Trinitarians tend to argue, 
human persons are or ought to be seen as constituted by their relations with one another. 
This understanding, they say, is the condition for subject-subject, as opposed to subject-
object relationships, which function on the principles of mutual or reciprocal equality and 
respect. By the same token, it is necessary for checking the authoritarianism, 
patriarchalism, and oppressive structures that dominate many human societies, including 
churches, and for overcoming modern individualism, which has fostered an unhealthy 
sense of personal autonomy from social relations.
11
 
Perhaps one reason why social Trinitarianism and panentheism have gained such 
considerable theological sway in recent years concerns the fact that they operate with a 
view to accomplishing what is at face value at highly commendable socio-political 
agenda—indeed, an agenda which it would be politically incorrect to oppose. Whereas 
panentheism presumably purports to render faith in the divine relevant and intelligible for 
contemporary society, which is alienated from God in so many ways, not least because of 
the atrocious forms of human evil and suffering that have have been witnessed in the past 
century, social Trinitarianism focuses on forging a way past modern individualism into a 
more communal form of life which is free of all forms of oppression and in which all 
persons are truly treated as equals. 
While I have no interest in anything but affirming such goals, I would submit that 
there is reason to question the tendency to confuse the divine with the human, and the 
human with the divine, that appears to underlie many of the the aforementioned strategies 
for their realization. This tendency could conceivably defeat the very purposes for which 
the strategies are developed. In that sense, those strategies might prove not only 
unsuitable to accomplishing their goals; they could go so far as to undermine them.  
Bracketing for the moment the problems that may arise from defining divine and 
human beings in a univocal way, however, I shall turn presently to take up my main 
project of illustrating how the doctrines of divine unity and Trinity, as well as the Trinity 
and Christian life, may be naturally linked in a broadly Thomist account. As will become 
evident through the ensuing discussion, this account holds great potential for 
                                                        
9
 Jurgen Moltmann, ‘Perichoresis, An Old Magic Word for a New Trinitarian Theology’, in M. Douglas 
Meeks (ed.), Trinity, Community, Power: Mapping Trajectories in Wesleyan Theology (Nashwood: 
Kingsood Books, 2000), pp. 69-83. Karen Kilby offers a relevant critique in, ‘Perichoresis and Projection: 
Problems with Social Doctrines of the Trinity’, New Blackfriars 81:957 (November 2000), pp. 432-45. 
Also see Carl Mosser in his article, ‘Fully Social Trinitarianism’, in Thomas McCall and Michael C. Rea 
(eds), Philosophical and Theological Essays on the Trinity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), where 
he writes: ‘According to perichoresis, the divine persons know and love one another in an unreserved, 
uninhibited, unmediated, and utterly unselfish manner. They therefore experience a depth of communion 
far beyond anything known in human society that results in a profound harmony of thought, purpose, and 
will. Power is exercised by the individual persons only with the consent and co-operation of the other two.’ 
10
 Carl Mosser, ‘Fully Social Trinitarianism’, 145.  
11
 On this matter, see especially the work of Moltmann in Trinity and the Kingdom of God, Boff in Trinity 
and Society, and Miroslav Volf in After Our Likeness.  
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accomplishing the goals stated above, which has not been sufficiently appreciated in 
recent years, particularly by those who have read it in the perhaps somewhat uncharitable 
or unsympathetic manner outlined above.  
 
A Broadly Thomist Account of the One-in-Three God 
 
In turning to Aquinas’ treatise on the one God, it becomes clear that his first and 
foremost concern is to establish the divine simplicity.
12
 Though the doctrine of divine 
simplicity is affirmed by diverse monotheist religious philosophies and religions, 
including the three Abrahamic faiths, these systems of belief are united in the claim that 
the doctrine confirms God’s total otherness to all known objects. While nature and 
creatures as Aquinas calls them are composed of parts, finite, temporal, and therefore 
subject to development, God is not divided nor limited nor tensed in any way. He always 
completely is what he is, which is to be one being which is and knows and wills and does 
all things good, and who is perfect in that sense.  
Though human beings, for instance, may imitate or participate in the unity or 
simplicity of God—the tendency to be one thing rather than another—by becoming the 
finite entities they are, it is precisely by these means that they illustrate that God is utterly 
transcendent and cannot be said in any way to share their characteristics or a common 
form of life. Indeed, the qualities of infinity, omnipresence, immutability, eternity, unity, 
and perfection which Aquinas invokes in developing his conception of divine simplicity, 
and which evidently unfold from it, serve not to disclose direct knowledge of God, as in a 
‘philosophical’ or ‘idolatrous’ analysis of his nature. Rather, they confirm that he is a 
kind of being that is above our knowledge.
13
 
By contrast to the way it is commonly understood, Aquinas’ account of the one 
God does not undermine but anticipate the connection between the oneness and threeness 
of the divine. In order to see how this is so, it is necessary to consider how Aquinas’ 
unpacks his understanding of the two processions, three persons, and four relations that 
subsist in the one God. The first principle of the two processions—that is, of generation 
and spiration—and therefore of the Trinity itself is God the Father. He alone is 
unbegotten: not produced by another. By contrast, the second person of the Son proceeds 
from the Father by way of knowledge or intellect. This is because his relationship to the 
Father is like that of one known by a knower.
14
  
When the Father knows the Son, on Aquinas’ account, he generates a thought of 
himself, that is, his image, or a word of self-expression.
15
 As God is the highest object of 
knowledge, his supreme knowledge as God consists simply in the knowledge of himself. 
Since the Father’s knowledge of the Son is reflexive, it can be likened to self-knowledge. 
Thus, the Son can conversely be said to know and make known the Father in the very 
experience of being known by him.  
With the proviso that a good withheld is not truly good, Aquinas argues that a 
good incapable of communicating itself along these lines could not be considered the 
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 ST (Summa Theologiae) Ia.3. 
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 ST 1a.3-11. See David Burrell’s defence of divine simplicity and riposte to process theology in, Aquinas: 
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highest good. Because the communication of goodness is an expression of love, Aquinas 
identifies love as the ultimate attribute of the Trinity in which the Father and the Son 
communicate God’s goodness to one another.16 This brings us to the role in the Godhead 
of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and the Son not by way of intellect but 
by way of the will—or love and desire—for that which is known, namely, the Son by the 
Father, and the Father, in turn, by the Son.
17
  
In Aquinas’ account, the Father’s knowing of the Son and the Son’s knowing of 
the Father ultimately reflect their mutual desire to know one another, that is, God’s desire, 
consisting in the Holy Spirit, to know himself and make himself known as the highest 
good that he is. Since the Spirit is indicative of the Father’s will to make himself known 
in the Son, and the Son’s will to know and make known the Father, he is generally 
described as the ‘Love’ or the ‘Gift’ exchanged between the Father and Son.18 In this 
connection, the Spirit is said to be spirated or breathed out by the Father and the Son 
(filioque), thus binding them in unity.
19
 Because this spiration enacts the knowledge 
shared by the knower and the known, the Spirit is said to constitute the very life or indeed 
the Spirit of the Trinity, which consists in honoring or loving God as the highest good or 
object of devotion and adoration, which he is known to be
.
.  
As the discussion above suggests, an appeal to the processions of the Son and 
Spirit from the Father generates an account of one God who does not merely exist as God 
but also knows and names or communicates himself as God, wants to act and indeed acts 
like God. Since a God incapable of knowing himself and acting as the supreme being 
could scarcely seem like such a being in the first place, it seems to follow that the 
doctrine of the Trinity delineates how the one God can be described as worthy of the 
name ‘God’. This is the upshot of Aquinas’ affirmation that God is his act of 
understanding, such that whatever is understood by God is the very living or life of 
God:
20
 God always completely is what he is, which is to be and to know and to say and to 
desire and to do all that is good, or consistent with love, because there is in him a perfect 
correspondence between who he is, what he knows, what he communicates, what he 
wants, and what he does.  
Against the supposition of many contemporary thinkers, therefore, Aquinas’ work 
is not plagued by a sharp division between accounts de Deo uno and de Deo trino—and 
the tendency to demote the doctrine of the Trinity. When the two treatises are interpreted 
on their own terms, the doctrine of the Trinity emerges as the condition for explaining 
fully how the one God may be described as the simple or supreme good monotheists 
believe him to be. That is not to undermine monotheisms that reject the teaching that God 
is Triune. Rather, it is to offer a rationale behind beliefs in one God that affirms them in 
the strongest possible terms. In offering this rationale, Aquinas’ treatise on the Trinity 
further corrects any sense that he might endorse a detached and uncompassionate God. 
For in affirming the intrinsically communicative or relational and thus personal nature of 
this God, the doctrine of the Trinity establishes his fundamental feature as that of love.  
                                                        
16
 ST Ia.37. 
17
 ST Ia.36. 
18
 ST Ia.37-8 
19
 ST Ia.27.3-4. 
20
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The loving or compassionate nature of God comes into even fuller relief when we 
consider the fact that there is for Aquinas no knowledge—at least for us—of the Trinity 
apart from the revelation of God at the Incarnation of his Son. Thus, it remains to explain 
how the ‘known unknown’ made himself known as such to humanity by assuming human 
personhood at the Incarnation. On a broadly Thomist conception of this event, Christ 
relayed the knowledge of the Triune God by continuing the work he eternally 
accomplishes within the Godhead.
21
 That is to say, he operated in the awareness of God 
as the highest good and with a view to accomplishing God’s good purposes. In that sense, 
the Son underwent no change in his nature as God in order to become Incarnate.
22
 If he 
had done so, it would follow that he became inconsistent or fickle with regard to the 
fulfilment of the Father’s will, not least to show compassion for and enable unfailingly 
the thriving of human beings.  
In that light, it appears that proponents of the view that God undergoes change 
even to the point of experiencing human suffering may have misunderstood the 
implications of the traditional doctrines of divine immutability and impassibility which 
they forcefully reject. Furthermore, they may have undermined the very objectives they 
set out to achieve when they described God as mutable and passible or capable of feeling, 
including suffering. In doing so, after all, they rendered him so like us as to make it 
theoretically impossible for him to show love by helping us in times of need in the way 
only God can.  
As rendered by the early Christian tradition, by contrast, the aforementioned 
doctrines were designed to guarantee God’s unfailing love and fidelity to his covenant 
with human beings—his commitment to make it possible for them to thrive through 
participation in his life, notwithstanding their general unfaithfulness thus to participate. 
For the sake of divine empathy with human suffering, the traditional account further 
posits in this connection that it sufficed for God to assume the human nature in which 
human beings actually suffer. He did not have to suffer as God, because it is irrelevant to 
human beings that he does so in a nature unfamiliar to our own. As already mentioned, 
moreover, it is contrary to the interests of humanity for God to suffer in this regard, since 
a God plagued by his own plights cannot rescue us from ours.
23
  
In Aquinas’ understanding, consequently, the Incarnation rather than an 
untraditional teaching about divine suffering is the answer to the question how God meets 
us in the hour of our deepest need. As Kathryn Tanner notes, there is in that light 
something telling and even worrying about the surprising lack of emphasis in panentheist 
and social Trinitarian accounts on Christology as the key to questions about what it 
means to participate in God and how this becomes possible for human beings.
24
  
Because Jesus Christ was as much human as he was God, he was able to reveal 
God to human beings by bringing his direct knowledge of God to bear in an indirect 
manner, that is, by assessing how to go about ordinary human life and activities and 
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 For a detailed discussion of this matter, see chapter three on Aquinas of Thomas Weinandy, Does God 
Change? The Word’s Becoming at the Incarnation (Still River: St Bede’s, 1985).  See also chapters four 
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23
 See Thomas Weinandy’s Thomist refutation of claims regarding divine suffering in Does God Suffer? 
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 Kathryn Tanner, ‘Social Trinitarianism and Its Critics’, in Rethinking Trinitarian Theology, ed. Robert J. 
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confront distinctly human situations in light of the knowledge of God as the highest good. 
By these means, he might be said to have expressed his Spirit (life, mind, personality, 
etc.) of love for the Father, that is, his desire to please the Father, and thus to have 
established implicitly the Triune nature of God. Since he was a human person, Christ’s 
revelation of the Trinity in the same instance confirmed that all human beings are made 
in the image of the Trinity to do as Christ did, namely, to express their spirits—lives, 
abilities, personalities—given through the creative work of the Son with a view to 
glorifying God the Father in every single circumstance.  
By thus operating in the light of the knowledge of God as highest good, human 
beings are safeguarded from the sinful human tendency to attribute too much significance 
to temporal objects and experiences—to treat them as though they could make or break 
human happiness. They are empowered instead to see all things in terms of the actual 
value or threat they pose and deal with them accordingly. In short, they are enabled to 
maintain an untainted—divine—perspective on reality. Although this perspective does 
not afford the direct knowledge of God, which Christ enjoyed, it does provide a sort of 
indirect knowledge of the maker, which comes by discerning the difference belief in him 
makes to the way we think and live in ordinary ways.  
The more consistently human beings operate in the light of the knowledge of God 
in ordinary circumstances and thus see God through the mediation of them, Aquinas 
believes, the more they predispose themselves to see him as he really is: the being who 
remains constantly the highest good. Since human beings were evidently made to factor 
the knowledge of God as highest good into all their ordinary activities, it stands to reason 
that there is no dichotomy between the two natures of Christ. For the divine nature simply 
enabled Christ to do infallibly and infinitely what human beings do falteringly and 
finitely. That is why Christ is appropriately referred to as the most human or universal 
‘human being’.  
Through his own paradigmatic example and atoning work—which it falls outside 
the scope of the present discussion to treat—Christ enabled us to participate in precisely 
the way it is possible for us as humans who are not also God to participate in the 
paradigmatic human life he led on account of his divinity. This brings us to the question 
as to what it means for human beings to participate in the life of the Trinity, which is 
another way of referring to the imitation of Christ. 
 
A Broadly Thomist Account of Participation 
 
On the basis of the account of the Trinity outlined above, I would submit that 
human participation in the divine life turns on efforts gradually to achieve the unity of 
being, knowledge, word, will, and action that characterizes the divine. The point of 
participation, in other words, is to come to a place of personal maturity. As the notion of 
self-knowledge suggests, achieving this maturity means learning accurately—neither 
excessively nor deficiently—to assess personal capacities, which at once represent 
limitations, and to employ them accordingly. This effort can take a good deal of 
experience, as well as some trial and error, to accomplish, precisely because human 
beings are temporal and therefore simply cannot know themselves fully straightaway, or 
perhaps even at any point in time. 
 8 
Furthermore, it is complicated by the sin of pride, which may manifest in extreme 
forms of hubris or false humility that nurse in persons desires to be something more, less, 
or altogether other than they actually are. By doing the most they can at any given stage 
to discover and actualize personal potential, in contrast, human beings overcome sin and 
achieve by grace through faith the highest level of maturity that is subjectively possible 
for them at the time. In that sense, they may participate fully in the life of the Trinity, in 
the way possible for them, while nonetheless falling short of the objective state of 
personal maturity towards which they still strive.  
While all human beings possess individual abilities and interests, I suggested 
above that many are hindered when it comes to using them—and fully realizing their 
potential—by the desire to be something they are not. As this suggests, a will to be the 
person God made one to be—no more, no less—to accept oneself in one’s state of 
finitude and feebleness—is in many respects the pre-condition of identifying and utilizing 
personal abilities. After all, it is impossible to know oneself and communicate about 
oneself appropriately, let alone act in accordance with accurate self-knowledge, while 
resenting the particular constraints of one’s own limited existence—either by trying to 
transcend them, as in hubris, or reducing oneself to them, as in false humility.  
The failure of the will in terms of self-acceptance inevitably generates a failure of 
the intellect in respect of self-knowledge. It is the reason why some individuals undertake 
activities for which they are not particularly well suited; why others neglect their 
potential; and why still others spend an excess of time wondering what they should be 
doing with their lives or second-guessing their decisions on this score. As this suggests, 
the first step towards overcoming sin involves regaining a proper love or appreciation for 
the persons God made us to be. That desire situates us not only to come gradually to a 
better understanding of ourselves but also to improve in the way we communicate 
ourselves and define our personal boundaries before others, and ultimately, engage in 
self-actualization: acts that accord with right self-knowledge and self-love.  
As we come by these means to a place of heightened continuity between who we 
are, who we know ourselves to be, who we want to be, how we relate to others or express 
ourselves, and how we act, I have noted that we increasingly imitate or participate in the 
fullness of being that characterizes the Triune God in an utterly simple and supreme 
manner which nevertheless remains foreign to us. Thus, it is through the ordinary 
operations of the human intellect, will, language, and life that we are formed after the 
image of God in Christ, in a way made possible by Christ, and come to reflect that image 
with increasing clarity and consistency. From this, it follows that there is no bifurcation 
between a life of participation in God and one that turns on participation in ordinary 
human activities. By this account, participation represents the rationale or formality under 
which human beings engage in their ordinary lives, namely, from a standpoint of faith in 
God as the highest good.  
Although it is only possible to know God indirectly, that is, by perceiving the 
difference belief in him makes to our way of evaluating ourselves and our world, while 
this life of ceaseless learning and self-discovery is ongoing, I have hinted that it is by 
achieving the highest possible level of personal maturity with respect to self-awareness, 
self-acceptance, self-expression, and self-actualization at any stage, that we become 
predisposed to see the divine being who is mature in the fullest and truest sense of the 
 9 
term. Of course, it remains impossible to attain maturity along these lines in the way that 
is proper to God.  
On account of the fundamental difference between the Creator and his creatures 
delineated above, human beings cannot share in the divine life in the way God is fit to 
participate in what is by definition his life. Rather, I have shown that we do so in ways 
that accord with our finitude and created natures. This difference between God and us 
bears further on our understanding of how we ought to develop in the context of a 
community life. While the very fact that the three individual persons of the Trinity enact 
divine unity through their community suggests that human individuality should be 
nurtured in a communal context as well, the Creator-creature distinction already clues us 
in to the fact that the way in which our individuality is consummated in community will 
differ qualitatively from the way in which this happens in God. 
On Aquinas’ seemingly plausible understanding, the Father, Son, and Spirit are 
unlimited, albeit distinct, as persons, precisely on account of the unbounded nature of 
God. Since their distinctive ‘personalities’, as it were, predispose them to enter into 
relations, the three persons are accordingly unlimited, albeit distinct, in terms of their 
capacity to relate to one another. Because of this unlimitedness-in-difference, there is 
nothing about the Father that is not made known to the Son in the Spirit and vice versa. 
So construed, the three persons of the Trinity are ‘personal’ and correspondingly 
‘relational’ in the fullest sense of the terms. Indeed, the persons are a function of their 
relations, which render God the one genuinely and supremely personal being.
25
 
By contrast to the divine persons, human persons are limited in their personalities 
and thus in their ability to relate to others. While this means that it is impossible for 
human beings to experience complete fulfilment in any given relationship, or in 
relationships overall, it also means that human beings are not and cannot rightly be 
defined by their relations. Though many social Trinitarians have argued to the contrary in 
their enthusiasm to promote human community and combat an unhealthy sense of 
autonomy, they seem not to have noticed that their position logically entails human 
confinement to circumstances of personal upbringing, social status, gender stereotypes, 
and instances of authoritarian or oppressive control which are all too common in human 
societies, not least within the Church. In trying to counteract individualism, in other 
words, they seem to pose a significant theoretical threat to the most vulnerable 
individuals.  
The present account steers a middle course between the individualism which 
rejects community and the communitarianism that potentially harmfully reduces 
individuals to a function of their social circumstances, however oppressive, by affirming 
that while we are like God in that our individuality can only flourish within community, 
we are unlike him in the sense that we are not ultimately defined by our communities.
26
 
Although human personalities can be called out through relationships, in other words, 
they remain prior to those relationships, as predispositions for engaging in them.
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Although a community poses a context in which to use our gifts, which are relatively 
useless apart from beneficiaries with whom to share them, as well as a responsibility to 
use those gifts to the benefit of others, its purpose by this account is therefore ultimately 
to facilitate the development of individuals, and to enable them to transcend gender 
stereotypes, disadvantage, and forms of oppression to this end.  
As the persons of the Trinity are equal though different, so a community should 
serve its members equally when it comes to helping them realize their potential in this 
way, even though operating to this effect may require different forms of service, to 
accommodate different human natures and needs. Moreover, a community should be 
overhauled, or even abandoned, if it fails to do so, since it is precisely in such a failure 
that a community fails in its purpose and is transformed into a perverse and potentially 
oppressive ‘pseudo-community’. This is all the more true if we consider the fact that the 
neglect of individuals to realize their potential—perhaps in part because of the constraints 
of a problematic community—represents a form of neglect that is not simply neutral in its 
effect but which has detrimental consequences for other living beings and especially 
human beings whose flourishing individuals may be gifted to foster in different ways and 
which is undermined when those gifts are not employed.  
Thus, the communitarian insistence that individuals conform to the ‘collective 
personality’28 or ‘group identity’ of a particular community, and whatever personality 
stereotypes this might entail, and the corresponding failure of individuals to ‘become 
themselves’ with the support of a community creates a vicious cycle in which 
communities hinder the thriving of individuals and vice versa. By sharp contrast, the 
account delineated above casts the process of achieving self-knowledge and self-
actualization, for example, as intrinsically social. Yet it does not do so in a way that 
destroys but uphold the integrity of individuals, and correspondingly, communities.  
Although I cannot in the space provided here delineate in greater detail what 
might be regarded as the problems with process thought and social doctrines of the 
Trinity, the arguments that have been developed thus far should at least suffice to show 
that a broadly Thomist understanding of the Trinity and human participation in the life of 
the Triune God does not fall prey to the problems that have been associated with it and 
that have motivated the development of untraditional theologies like those just mentioned. 
In fact, the traditional theology outlined here appears to resolve the very problems such 
theologies purport to solve without resorting to what might be regarded as a deeply 
concerning tendency to efface the difference between God and humans, and humans and 
Gods, upon which the integrity of the above account and theology in general turns.  
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